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THE CHALLENGES OF CRYPTOCURRENCY  
ASSET RECOVERY 
Andrew W. Balthazor* 
ABSTRACT 
Cryptocurrencies, like Bitcoin, present challenges to plaintiffs seeking 
to recover these digital assets. No third-party intermediaries are involved in 
cryptocurrency transactions, and there is no controlling authority that can 
revoke or avoid a transaction once completed. The possessor of a 
cryptocurrency’s private key—its password—has total and exclusive control 
over the account’s assets. These digital assets cross jurisdictional boundaries 
without impediment. The features of cryptocurrencies make it easy for 
defendants to judgment-proof themselves and make these assets difficult to 
recover after a court has entered judgment. This comment explains 
cryptocurrency features relevant to asset recovery, explores pre- and post-
judgment procedures as applied to cryptocurrencies, and suggests ways to 
mitigate the risks of this potentially difficult-to-recover asset.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Paul Vernon of Cryptsy, a Florida-based cryptocurrency exchange, stole 
more than 11,000 bitcoins in 2014 and fled to China.1 Affected customers 
filed a class action suit in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida.2 The court ordered a default judgment against Vernon, 
declaring the stolen bitcoins the property of the plaintiff class.3 But the 
plaintiffs have been unable to recover the stolen currency.4 They know where 
the funds are located: in bitcoin addresses, similar in function to a bank 
account.5 But the victims cannot access the funds associated with those 
addresses without the private keys: strings of characters that grant access to 
those bitcoin addresses.6 The prevailing plaintiffs do not know the private 
keys—and do not know anyone else who would know them—with the 
exception of the thief, Vernon.7  
Courts are limited in their power to force the illegitimate wielder of a 
private key to return stolen cryptocurrency, due to the qualities of this 
intangible asset.8 Cryptocurrencies’ only real-world footprint are the private 
keys granting access to the funds, and then only if the private key is stored 
somewhere tangible.9 Cryptocurrencies ignore physical borders, transaction 
quantity limits, or other traditional currency controls. And cryptocurrency 
transactions, once completed, are essentially irreversible due to the lack of a 
 
1 Angela Morris, Judge Orders $30 Million in Bitcoin to Be Returned in Cryptocurrency Class 
Action, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., Aug. 3, 2017, at A1, available at 
https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/e067ba8f-6e83-4192-a430-dcc793182938/?context=1000516. 
2 Id.  
3 Final Default Judgment at 1–2, Liu v. Project Inv’rs, No. 9:16-cv-80060 (S.D. Fla. July 27, 2017), 
ECF No. 123 [hereinafter Liu Final Default Judgment]. 
4 Morris, supra note 1. 
5 See Liu Final Default Judgment, supra note 3, at 2. 
6 See Morris, supra note 1. 
7 Id. Cryptsy’s receiver hired a former employee to perform a tracing analysis of Vernon’s theft, 
concluding that Vernon transferred cryptocurrencies to digital wallets under Vernon’s control. Affidavit 
of Nicholas Mullesch (August 5, 2016) at 6–7, Liu, 9:16-cv-80060 (attachment # 1 to the plaintiffs’ motion 
for entry of final default judgment) [hereinafter Mullesch Affidavit]. 
8 See Morris, supra note 1.  
9 Max I. Raskin, Realm of the Coin: Bitcoin and Civil Procedure, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
969, 975 (2015). 
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controlling authority that can undo transactions.10 Digital currencies are 
freely transferrable from one digital wallet to another without need for a bank 
or other third-party intermediary, unlike conventional currencies or 
securities.11 Cryptocurrency is under the sole control of whomever has the 
private key to a bitcoin address; only the person possessing the private key 
of a receiving account has any power over the funds received.12  
This new “digital gold” is particularly attractive to thieves, who need 
only purloin the private key to gain control of hundreds of millions of dollars 
in virtual wealth.13 Private keys are vulnerable to both cyber and traditional 
theft.14 Thieves no longer need be concerned about physically breaking and 
entering property, or fleeing a jurisdiction with their ill-gotten gains; they 
simply need access to a private key for mere moments to complete a 
cryptocurrency heist.15 And once a thief with a private key transfers digital 
funds, those criminal transactions cannot be undone unless the recipient 
account’s private key holder can be identified.16  
The only method to return stolen cryptocurrency is to gain control of the 
private key associated with the bitcoin address in which the currency stored, 
which may be impossible. Bitcoin addresses are often anonymous.17 And 
because a thief can transfer the funds to an account controlled by a physically-
distant person, that person—even if identifiable—may be out of reach by 
whatever court asserted jurisdiction over the stolen cryptocurrency 
litigation.18 In such a situation only the physical assets within the jurisdiction 
of appropriate courts would be subject to a court’s judgment. Even assuming 
the cryptocurrency thief had reachable assets, their value may be insignificant 
compared to the value of the stolen currency.  
Vernon’s Cryptsy victims faced this problem. They knew who 
possessed the stolen currency, and which bitcoin addresses contained their 
 
10 See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN PROJECT, 1, 
http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. 
11 See Nakamoto, supra note 10, at 1. 
12 Raskin, supra note 9, at 975. 
13 Cryptocurrency values are volatile, but at the time of writing this the value of Vernon’s stolen 
11,325 bitcoins was approximately US $142 million. bitcoin (USD) Price, COINDESK, 
https://www.coindesk.com/price/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2018) [hereinafter COINDESK bitcoin Price]. 
14 See Raskin, supra note 9, at 977. 
15 See id. at 989. 
16 See Nakamoto, supra note 10, at 1. 
17 See Nakamoto, supra note 10, at 6. 
18 See Raskin, supra note 9, at 998. 
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stolen bitcoins.19 But Vernon had fled to China, 20 leaving behind real-world 
assets worth less than two percent of the value of the stolen bitcoins.21 Vernon 
ignored the court’s jurisdiction, failing to respond to the action in any way. 22 
Out of the country and out of reach, the court was powerless to force Vernon 
to return or to surrender his ill-gotten gains.23  
Cryptocurrency’s value and susceptibility to theft will attract criminals 
at an ever-increasing rate. At least 10% of Bitcoin—the most prevalent 
cryptocurrency in the world—has been stolen and recirculated.24 
Cryptocurrencies are volatile but maintain significant real-world value. 
Motivated thieves are creatively applying criminal schemes designed to 
illicitly transfer this digital wealth.25 The lack of any method to undo a 
cryptocurrency heist or provide an effective remedy to victims means that 
once cryptocurrencies are lost, they may be lost forever. 
This comment identifies the challenges presented by applying 
conventional judgment enforcement and asset recovery procedures to 
cryptocurrencies. It begins by providing relevant background regarding 
cryptocurrencies. This includes cryptocurrency properties, how 
cryptocurrencies interact with the financial system, and some common 
characteristics of cases where quantities of cryptocurrency are held by 
defendants or are subject to judgment. The comment then explores the 
efficacy of existing asset recovery procedures applied to cryptocurrencies, 
including procedures intended to prevent defendants from moving or hiding 
assets, and why in many situations such procedures are unsatisfactory. 
Finally, this comment suggests ways to mitigate the risks of an unsatisfactory 
recovery when dealing with defendants possessing cryptocurrency.  
II. UNDERSTANDING CRYPTOCURRENCY 
Understanding the abstract characteristics of cryptocurrencies is 
necessary to appreciate the limitations of asset recovery procedures as 
applied to bitcoin. What follows is an introduction to the relevant features of 
 
19 Morris, supra note 1; see Liu Final Default Judgment, supra note 3, at 2. 
20 Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 10, Liu v. Project Inv’rs, No. 9:16-cv-80060 (S.D. 
Fla. filed Jan. 9, 2017) (basing the allegation on Vernon’s ex-wife’s filings pursuant to their divorce, which 
was contemporaneous with Vernon’s theft from Cryptsy and its customers) [hereinafter Liu Complaint]. 
21 See id. at 10–11 (basing allegations of Vernon’s net worth on Vernon’s affidavit filed pursuant 
to his divorce: less than $2 million). 
22 See Liu Final Default Judgment, supra note 3, at 1. 
23 Morris, supra note 1. 
24 See Raincoaster, Ten Percent of All Bitcoin in Circulation was Just Stolen, THE CRYPTOSPHERE 
(Feb. 9, 2015), https://thecryptosphere.com/2015/02/09/ten-percent-of-all-bitcoin-in-circulation-was-
just-stolen/. 
25 See Raskin, supra note 9, at 998 & n.217. 
13 - BALTHAZOR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/30/19 7:47 PM 
2019] The Challenges of Cryptocurrency Asset Recovery 1211 
cryptocurrencies and how these assets interact with the real world. This 
includes a presentation of characteristics common to cases involving 
recovery of digital currencies. The properties of cryptocurrencies and the 
characteristics of cryptocurrency cases work in concert to make it difficult to 
recover these novel assets.  
A. Bitcoin: The Original Cryptocurrency 
Cryptocurrencies are mediums of exchange that exist as a compilation 
of digital transactions. The first and most widely used such currency is 
Bitcoin.26 All succeeding cryptocurrencies are based on the same technology 
underpinning Bitcoin, and they share many of the same features.27  
In 2008,28 Satoshi Nakamoto29 proposed Bitcoin as a peer-to-peer 
system for exchanging value independent of any central authority.30 
Nakamoto sought to create a system that would eliminate the need for a 
trusted intermediary to negotiate payments.31 Such a system would allow 
“non-reversible payments,” theoretically reducing transaction costs.32 It 
would also eliminate the need for merchants to gather information from 
customers, a need that exists only when merchants must submit the payment 
information to a traditional third-party payment processor for verification of 
funds.33  
1. Operational Features 
Bitcoin has many features that serve to remove it from the sphere of 
control of government. The owner of bitcoins has complete control over her 
digital wealth, and no outside force can take bitcoins from an owner who 
maintains integrity of their ownership.34 Bitcoin is decentralized and 
democratic by design, operating without any central authority that can 
 
26 FAQ, BITCOIN PROJECT, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq (last visited Feb. 19, 2018) [hereinafter 
BITCOIN FAQ]. Throughout this Comment, the word Bitcoin is capitalized when it is used as the name of 
the Bitcoin software itself. Lowercase type is employed when referring to individual units of value. 
27 See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26.  
28 See Raskin, supra note 9, at 971. 
29 The identify of Satoshi Nakamoto is a mystery. See id. at 974 n.31. But see BLOOMBERG, Self-
Proclaimed Inventor of Bitcoin Accused of Swindling $5 Billion in Cryptocurrency, FORTUNE (Feb. 27, 
2018), http://fortune.com/2018/02/26/craig-wright-bitcoin/. 
30 See Nakamoto, supra note 10, at 1. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 See Raskin, supra note 9, at 977. 
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enforce its will on users; any changes to the Bitcoin system are only 
implemented by majority consent of all worldwide users running the 
software.35 Transactions ignore political borders, are irrevocable absent the 
consent of the possessor, and ownership of bitcoins is anonymous. Because 
of the software’s mechanics, it is practically impossible for any government, 
or any group, to control Bitcoin.36  
The units of exchange of the Bitcoin system are bitcoins, an entirely 
digital resource controlled only by those who generate or receive them.37 
There are no physical “coins.”38 Instead, bitcoins are associated with an 
address.39 Each address has its own alphanumeric designation, serving a 
function like a bank account number.40 Knowing a bitcoin address allows 
anyone to deposit funds into it. But to use the digital funds associated with a 
bitcoin address, one must also possess the private key, which is a different 
alphanumeric string of characters.41 Only the possessor of an address’s 
private key may make withdrawals—outgoing payments.42  
Bitcoin’s backbone is a distributed digital ledger known as a 
blockchain.43 The Bitcoin blockchain contains a complete record of all 
transactions.44 Determining the “account balance” for a Bitcoin address is 
done by adding all incoming and outgoing transactions associated with the 
address.45 The Bitcoin blockchain, which stores the digital ledger of 
transactions, is a distributed database.46 It is distributed in the sense that many 
copies of the same database reside on every computer running the Bitcoin 
software.47 If a user attempts to send bitcoin from an address, the Bitcoin 
algorithm validates that the user has the correct private key and the requisite 
 
35 See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26. 
36 See Catherine Martin Christopher, The Bridging Model: Exploring the Roles of Trust and 
Enforcement in Banking, Bitcoin, and the Blockchain, 17 NEV. L.J. 139, 144–45 (2016) (describing as 
“preposterous” the idea that any one group could accumulate the computing power necessary to reverse 
transactions or make unilateral changes to the software). 
37 See Raskin, supra note 9, at 975–78. 
38 There are physical bitcoins that are gag gifts or “conversation pieces,” but they are extraneous 
to the Bitcoin system itself. See Nermin, Hajdarbegovic, 10 Physical Bitcoins: The Good, the Bad and the 
Ugly, COINDESK (Sep. 14, 2014, 4:15 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/10-physical-bitcoins-good-bad-
ugly/. 
39 See Raskin, supra note 28, at 975. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 See Nakamoto, supra note 30, at 2.  
45 See Raskin, supra note 28, at 975. 
46 Id. 
47 See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26. 
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bitcoins available for the transaction.48 Every computer running the Bitcoin 
software conducts this validation on its copy of the distributed database.49 
The validating computers compare their results via the internet.50 
Transactions are only processed if the majority of the computers running the 
software agree a transaction is valid.51 As the software processes transactions, 
the transactions are added to the distributed ledger in batches known as 
blocks, lengthening the chain of transactions maintained by every copy of the 
distributed database: the blockchain.52  
Without numerous computers running the Bitcoin software, the system 
would be vulnerable to control by a single entity with sufficient computer 
resources.53 The decentralized ledger model only works because Bitcoin has 
an integrated feature that encourages broad adoption of the software: bitcoin 
mining.54 Bitcoin mining is operating the Bitcoin software as a validating 
computer, processing bitcoin transactions. To incentivize broad adoption of 
the Bitcoin software by computers for validating transactions, bitcoin mining 
generates new bitcoins for the bitcoin miner, adding to the global supply.55 
Miners may also earn transaction fees paid by those conducting 
transactions.56 
Conducting Bitcoin transactions only requires that a user have access to 
the software and be connected to the internet.57 She then may freely transfer 
the digital assets to other Bitcoin addresses if the software validates those 
transactions.58 Geographic or political borders are irrelevant; transactions 
cross jurisdictions limited only by the reach of the internet.  
Adding transactions to the blockchain is essentially irrevocable.59 
Adding a new transaction that reverses the effect of a transaction is possible, 
but only the possessor of a private key can do so. Without the private key, 
the majority of the computers attempting to validate the transaction would 
interpret the transaction as invalid. However, a single person or group could 
gain majority control of computers running the cryptocurrency software and 
 
48 See Raskin, supra note 9, at 975–76. 
49 See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 See Nakamoto, supra note 30, at 8. 
54 See id. at 4. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26. 
58 See id. 
59 See Nakamoto, supra note 30, at 1. 
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then “validate” any transactions they wished.60 This type of “51% attack” is 
impractical to execute if the cryptocurrency software is running on sufficient 
numbers of computers.61 Asserting control over the Bitcoin software like this 
is impractical, given the large number of computers running the Bitcoin 
software.62 It is exactly this type of attack that bitcoin mining is designed to 
prevent, by encouraging users to run the software to mine coins.  
Accordingly, Bitcoin users cannot remove or reverse transactions if 
made by accident or fraud. The received bitcoins are fully under the control 
of the person who possesses the private key associated with the recipient 
bitcoin address. The recipient is the only person who can return the funds. 
There is no appeal and no authority to turn to that can help.  
A consequence of Bitcoin’s blockchain—its distributed ledger, stored 
on every computer running the Bitcoin software—is that all Bitcoin 
transactions are public.63 Knowing a Bitcoin address allows one to know 
every incoming and outgoing bitcoin transaction associated with the 
address.64 Ownership of a Bitcoin address is anonymous within the 
blockchain. This anonymity carries a substantial caveat:  
[T]he anonymity is by no means perfect. Security experts 
call it pseudonymous privacy, like writing books under a 
nom de plume. You can preserve your privacy as long as the 
pseudonym is not linked to you. But as soon as somebody 
makes the link to one of your anonymous books, the ruse is 
revealed.65 
The distributed ledger allows tracing of bitcoin back to its generation, by 
following the trail of Bitcoin addresses through which the bitcoin has 
traveled.66 
Bitcoin’s features support its design: to be a digital currency operating 
outside the control of any central authority.67 The Bitcoin system’s mining-
 
60 See id. at 4. 
61 Compare Daniel Cawrey, Are 51% Attacks a Real Threat to Bitcoin?, COINDESK (June 20, 
2014, 6:42 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/51-attacks-real-threat-bitcoin/ (discussing the improbability 
of a 51% attack on Bitcoin), with Kai Sedgwick, Verge is Forced to Fork After Suffering a 51% Attack, 
BITCOIN.COM (Apr. 5, 2018), https://news.bitcoin.com/verge-is-forced-to-fork-after-suffering-a-51-
attack/ (reporting the successful 51% attack on a smaller, less-used cryptocurrency). 
62 See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26. 
63 Bitcoin Transactions Aren’t as Anonymous as Everyone Hoped, MIT TECH. REV.: EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGY FROM THE ARXIV (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608716/bitcoin-
transactions-arent-as-anonymous-as-everyone-hoped/ [hereinafter ARXIV]. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 See Adam Ludwin, How Anonymous is Bitcoin? A Backgrounder for Policymakers, COINDESK 
(Jan. 25, 2015, 8:45 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/anonymous-bitcoin-backgrounder-policymakers/. 
67 See Nakamoto, supra note 30, at 1. 
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incentive model expands the number of validating nodes checking 
transactions and maintaining copies of the distributed ledger. The 
decentralized spread of the Bitcoin network, its autonomous consensus-based 
transaction validation algorithm, and its lack of a centralized controlling 
authority prevents any one group or government gaining control over the 
Bitcoin network. 
2. Security Features 
Bitcoin is subject to theft like any other asset.68 The Bitcoin system’s 
decentralization and cryptographic-based security help maintain the system’s 
integrity. But individual bitcoin accounts are only as secure as the possessor’s 
private key. 
Theft by manipulating the Bitcoin algorithm itself is unlikely, due to 
Bitcoin’s decentralized consensus-based model.69 Bitcoin is only transferred 
if the transaction is validated by a majority of the computer nodes running 
the Bitcoin software; invalid transactions are rejected.70 New bitcoins, 
generated by miners, are validated and added in a way that is impossible to 
replicate artificially.71 Persons attempting to adjust the computer code 
underlying the software and inject counterfeit transactions would find their 
transactions invalidated by the majority of the computer nodes running 
unadulterated versions of the software.72 Double-spending of the same digital 
currency, or counterfeit creation of bitcoins, is thus impossible.73  
Complex mathematical equations founded on cryptography protect 
bitcoins possessed by individual owners, hence the name: cryptocurrency.74 
Bitcoins associated with a bitcoin address can only be spent by those who 
 
68 See Raskin, supra note 9, at 989. 
69 See Nakamoto, supra note 10, at 8. 
70 See id. at 3. 
71 See id. at 4. 
72 See id. at 2. 
73 See id. 
74 See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26. 
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possess that address’s private key.75 It is theoretically impossible to crack a 
private key.76 Bitcoin has no password recovery tools.77  
Private keys are the one Achilles heel of the Bitcoin system. Thieves 
can steal private keys, providing unfettered access to the associated digital 
assets.78 Owners protect and store private keys in a variety of ways.79 Some 
go low-tech: private keys written down on paper.80 Hard-copies of private 
keys are impervious to cybertheft. Others store their private keys on offline 
digital devices, likewise making them immune to hacking.81 Some owners 
with substantial cryptocurrency assets under their control may split up their 
private keys, placing different parts of the same key in separate locations.82 
This prevents a single theft from compromising their digital hoard, deterring 
thieves from attempting what would require a series of coordinated heists. 
There are several digital wallet software options which can store numerous 
private keys.83 These digital wallets are themselves protected by additional 
layers of encryption, passcodes, and multi-factor authorization.84 For 
example, one bitcoin owner wears a ring with an embedded code that grants 
him access to his digital wallet.85 Digital wallets are stored either on remote 
servers or locally, providing a tradeoff between convenience and security.86  
 
75 Raskin, supra note 9, at 975. 
76 See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26; see also Matthew Sparkes, The £625m Lost Forever - The 
Phenomenon of Disappearing Bitcoins, THE TELEGRAPH (Jan. 23, 2015), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/11362827/The-625m-lost-forever-the-phenomenon-of-
disappearing-Bitcoins.html (“Security expert Bruce Schneier once ruled out an attempt to crack a 256-bit 
key, of the type used by Bitcoin, by referring to the laws of physics: such is the magnitude of the problem. 
Even an impracticably large computer consuming all the energy outputted by the sun couldn’t count the 
number of possible combinations in several decades.”). 
77 See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26 (“[L]ost bitcoins remain dormant forever because there is no 
way for anybody to find the private key(s) that would allow them to be spent again.”). 
78 Raskin, supra note 9, at 989. 
79 See id. at 990–91 (describing storing private keys on paper stored in safety deposit boxes, in the 
cloud, or on hard drives). 
80 Id. at 990. 
81 Securing Your Wallet, BITCOIN PROJECT, https://bitcoin.org/en/secure-your-wallet (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2018) [hereinafter BITCOIN Wallet]. 
82 See, e.g., Secure Bitcoin Storage, COINBASE, https://www.coinbase.com/security (last visited 
Jan. 1, 2018) [hereinafter COINBASE Bitcoin Storage] (describing how Coinbase, one of the largest 
cryptocurrency exchanges in the world, secures its “bitcoin geographically in safe deposit boxes and vaults 
around the world”). 
83 BITCOIN Wallet, supra note 81. 
84 Id. 
85 Max Raskin, Meet the Bitcoin Millionaires, BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 12, 2013, 12:41 PM), 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-04-10/meet-the-bitcoin-millionaires. 
86 BITCOIN Wallet, supra note 81. 
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B. Cryptocurrency Exchanges 
Bitcoin has thus far failed to displace conventional payment systems and 
currencies.87 The purpose of Bitcoin was to act as a medium of exchange 
outside the control of governmental central banks, placing financial assets 
completely within the domain of the owner.88 Achieving this purpose 
required widespread adoption by merchants. But widespread adoption has 
not happened.89 Purveyors of goods and services are reluctant to accept 
bitcoin payments because of the asset’s volatility, high transaction fees, and 
slow transaction times.90 Traditional payment systems are comparatively 
cheaper and faster and conventional fiat currency is a more predictable store 
of value. 
If Bitcoin is not replacing other currencies or payment systems, it must 
intersect with conventional currencies for people to make meaningful use of 
their assets.91 Some owners transact bitcoins for traditional currencies by 
locating interested parties using message boards or websites.92 This practice 
can be cumbersome and prone to problems. It may take time to find another 
person who meets desired terms. And because Bitcoin transactions are peer-
to-peer and do not involve a third party, any transaction is fraught with the 
risk that if you send your bitcoins to another they may simply abscond with 
the currency and disappear.93  
Cryptocurrency exchanges offer a place to buy or sell cryptocurrencies 
for conventional currencies.94 They attract a high volume of traders, like a 
stock exchange.95 Many exchanges operate like a third-party escrow service; 
the two traders exchange their assets with the exchange, and only once the 
exchange has received the assets from both parties does the exchange release 
funds to their respective new owners.96 Cryptocurrency exchanges operate by 
charging a per-transaction fee and work with a variety of different digital and 
 
87 Christopher, supra note 36, at 152 (observing that bitcoins are not a functional currency because 
they are not used by enough people for bitcoins to be a medium of exchange). 
88 See Nakamoto, supra note 10, at 1. 
89 Christopher, supra note 36, at 152. 
90 Id. 
91 See Christopher, supra note 36, at 151. 
92 See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26; e.g., LOCALBITCOINS.COM (last visited Feb. 19, 2018). 
93 See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26; e.g., Hallie Detrick, Someone Stole 7 Bitcoins from Apple Co-
Founder Steve Wozniak, FORTUNE (Feb. 27, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/02/27/apple-steve-wozniak-
bitcoin-theft/ (“Wozniak sold the bitcoins to someone who paid for them with a credit card. The credit 
card transaction was then cancelled before it cleared, leaving him with nothing to show for [it]. The credit 
card number turned out to be stolen . . . .”). 
94 See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26. 
95 Christopher, supra note 36, at 151. 
96 Id. 
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fiat currencies. Cryptocurrency exchanges maintain fiat currency accounts 
for their operations, as well as bitcoin and other cryptocurrency addresses as 
necessary.  
Cryptocurrency exchanges provide convenient methods to exchange 
digital and conventional currencies using online accounts.97 These exchange-
managed accounts serve the same functions as digital wallets. And like digital 
wallets, owners may protect cryptocurrency exchange accounts with 
encryption, passcodes, and multi-factor authorization.98  
Exchanges add vulnerabilities to the cryptocurrency ecosystem by 
providing additional avenues of attack for thieves:99 the assets held by the 
individual owners (accessible via their exchange-managed account), and the 
assets held by the exchange itself.100 Cryptocurrency exchanges are 
vulnerable to cybertheft because exchanges must be online to conduct 
cryptocurrency transactions.101 Mt. Gox was the largest cryptocurrency 
exchange in the world until it began collapsing in 2013.102 It lost 850,000 
bitcoins due to hacking.103 Exchanges mitigate the risk of cybertheft by 
keeping some portion of their digital assets offline, using private keys stored 
away from the internet.104 Cryptocurrency exchanges are also prone to 
familiar white-collar crimes: embezzlement and fraud.105 Vernon’s Cryptsy 
customers learned this the hard way, when he embezzled the entirety of his 
exchange’s assets to accounts under his personal control.106 
 
97 See, e.g., How to Buy Bitcoin, COINBASE, https://www.coinbase.com/buy-bitcoin (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2018). 
98 See, e.g., How Can I Make My Account More Secure?, COINBASE: SUPPORT, 
https://support.coinbase.com/customer/en/portal/articles/1447997-how-can-i-make-my-account-more-
secure- (last visited Dec. 20, 2018). 
99 Steve Stecklow, Alexandra Harney, Anna Irrera & Jemima Kelly, Special Report: Chaos and 
Hackers Stalk Investors on Cryptocurrency Exchanges, REUTERS (Sept. 29, 2017, 6:55 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-bitcoin-exchanges-risks/special-report-chaos-and-hackers-stalk-
investors-on-cryptocurrency-exchanges-idUSKCN1C42JV (“These exchanges, which match buyers and 
sellers and sometimes hold traders’ funds, have become magnets for fraud and mires of technological 
dysfunction . . . .”). 
100 See Jason Tashea, What’s Actually Happening When a Cryptocurrency Gets Hacked?, ABA J. 
(Feb. 28, 2018, 12:32 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/lawscribbler/article/whats_actually_happening_when_a_cryptocurrency_get
s_hacked/?utm_source=feeds&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=site_rss_feeds. 
101 See, e.g., Robert McMillan, The Inside Story of Mt. Gox, Bitcoin’s $460 Million Disaster, 
WIRED (Mar. 3, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/03/bitcoin-exchange/. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 See, e.g., COINBASE Bitcoin Storage, supra note 82. 
105 See, e.g., Morris, supra note 1. 
106 See id. 
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III. ENFORCING JUDGMENTS AGAINST DEFENDANTS WITH 
CRYPTOCURRENCY 
A party seeking to recover cryptocurrency faces two sets of challenges. 
Prior to judgment there is a risk that a defendant may attempt to judgment-
proof themselves, preventing enforcement of a judgment debt by concealing 
or transferring digital assets in such a way that may make the cryptocurrency 
difficult to locate after a court enters judgment. And post-judgment, a 
defendant may find herself frustrated by the fact that only the wielder of a 
private key may control the use of cryptocurrency funds; not all wielders give 
up that exclusive control willingly. Only certain pre-judgment and post-
judgment remedies are applicable to cryptocurrencies. Some are more useful 
than others, and a few are not applicable at all.  
There have been relatively few civil actions involving cryptocurrency. 
These cases include commercial disputes, fraud, bankruptcy actions where 
the debtor possesses cryptocurrency, and actions against insolvent companies 
in receivership.107 Many of these cases involve contracts for cryptocurrency 
services or mining computers.108 Others involve theft or fraud.109 These cases 
 
107 See, e.g., CFTC v. McDonnell, No. 18-cv-00361, 2018 BL 76558, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 6, 2018) (virtual currency fraud); Complaint at 1–2, SEC v. Montroll, No. 1:18-cv-01582 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 21, 2018) (securities fraud); Complaint at 31-38, Kleiman v. Wright, No. 9:18-cv-80176 (S.D. Fla. 
Feb. 14, 2018) (alleging conversion and misappropriation) [hereinafter Kleiman Complaint]; Class Action 
Complaint at 1–2, Paige v. Bitconnect Int’l PLC , No. 3:18-cv-00058 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 29, 2018) (alleging 
Ponzi and pyramid schemes); SEC v. Plexcorps, No. 17-cv-07007, 2017 BL 448742, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 
14, 2017) (securities fraud); Class Action Complaint at 1, Rensel v. Centra Tech, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-24500 
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2017) (alleging securities fraud); Audet v. Fraser, No. 3:16-cv-00940, 2017 BL 
364322, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 11, 2017) (alleging securities fraud); Liedel v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 16-81992-
CIV, 2017 BL 184681, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 1, 2017) (aiding and abetting a third party’s breach of 
fiduciary duty); Alexander v. BF Labs Inc., No. CV 14-2159, 2016 WL 6581460, at *1 (D. Kan. Nov. 7, 
2016) (breach of contract); Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 206 F.Supp. 3d 1362, 1369-70 (N.D. Ill. 2016) 
(tortious interference and fraudulent concealment relating to collapse of a cryptocurrency exchange); 
Morici v. Hashfast Techs. LLC, No. 5:14-CV-00087, 2015 WL 4880670, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2015) 
(breach of contract and fraud); FTC v. BF Labs Inc., No. 4:14-CV-00815, 2014 WL 7238080, at *1 (W.D. 
Mo. Dec. 12, 2014) (breach of contract); Meissner v. BF Labs Inc., No. 13-2617, 2014 WL 2558203, at 
*1 (D. Kan. June 6, 2014) (breach of contract); TradeHill, Inc. v. Dwolla, Inc., No. C-12-1082, 2012 WL 
1622668, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2012) (enforcing arbitration agreement involving cryptocurrency 
services). 
108 See cases cited supra note 107. 
109 See, e.g., Liu Final Default Judgment, supra note 3, at 1–2 (embezzling from a cryptocurrency 
exchange); Order for Entry of Default Judgment at 1, SEC v. Garza, No. 3:15-cv-01760 (D. Conn. May 
29, 2017) (operating a Ponzi scheme) [hereinafter Garza Default Judgment]; Hussein v. Coinabul, LLC, 
No. 14-cv-05735, 2014 BL 358914, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2014) (promising gold or silver in exchange 
for bitcoin, and not delivering); Lenell v. Advanced Mining Tech., Inc., No. 14-cv-01924, 2014 WL 
7008609, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2014) (fraud involving failure to delivery mining machines); SEC v. 
Shavers, No. 4:13-cv-416, 2014 BL 259471, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2014) (running a bitcoin Ponzi 
scheme). 
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are useful to illustrate the challenges facing attorneys seeking to recover from 
a defendant who holds digital currencies.  
A. Pre-Judgment Remedies 
Ensuring a defendant has funds reachable by judgment enforcement 
mechanisms is sometimes necessary to ensure satisfaction of judgments. 
Judgment-proofing techniques prevent enforcement of judgment debts 
designed to render any judgment difficult or impossible to collect from the 
debtor.110 For example, a defendant may place assets in the possession of a 
business entity or person whose assets are not subject to any potential liability 
arising from the defendant’s conduct.111 Or a defendant may move assets—
and possibly herself—to a foreign jurisdiction that does not give legal force 
to domestic judgments.112  
Pre-judgment remedies are available to prevent a defendant from 
executing some judgment-proofing tactics. However, a plaintiff seeking 
purely monetary damages generally cannot ask a court to control a 
defendant’s assets before judgment.113 This restriction is inapplicable if there 
are claims for equitable relief, 114 such as specific performance or replevin, or 
if there is a statutory basis for rescinding a fraudulent sale of a security.  
If the facts of the case allow, plaintiffs seeking the return of their 
cryptocurrency may allege a claim for replevin to ensure that equitable pre-
judgment remedies are available.115  
1. Preliminary Injunctions, Generally 
Courts may preliminarily enjoin a defendant to prevent her from moving 
assets to avoid judgment. Preliminary injunctions require notice to the 
adverse party and an opportunity for the adverse party to be heard.116 In 
certain situations, the court may grant preliminary relief without notice to the 
 
110 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 14 (1996). 
111 Id. at 20–23, 30–32. 
112 Id. at 32–33. 
113 See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 321 (1999) 
(following “the well-established general rule that a judgment establishing the debt was necessary before 
a court of equity would interfere with the debtor’s use of his property”). But see Deckert v. Independence 
Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 290 (1940) (preliminary injunction of money assets proper where defendant 
“was insolvent and its assets in danger of dissipation or depletion”). 
114 See Desarrollo, 527 U.S. at 324–25. 
115 See, e.g., Kleiman Complaint, supra note 107, at 34–35 (alleging replevin claim for the return 
of approximately $10 billion in bitcoins). 
116 See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a). 
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other party on a showing of sufficient urgency by the party seeking the 
injunction.117 A plaintiff must “establish that he is likely to succeed on the 
merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an 
injunction is in the public interest.”118 Proving irreparable harm also means 
proving that monetary damages are inadequate to compensate for the 
injury.119 Courts sometimes grant preliminary relief when plaintiffs show a 
defendant is effectively insolvent and will be unable to satisfy money 
judgments.120  
A plaintiff may be able to show imminent irreparable injury if a 
cryptocurrency defendant signals their intentions that they are preparing to 
hide or move assets. Signals of such an intention may include: liquidating or 
gifting real-world assets;121 establishing accounts at foreign cryptocurrency 
exchanges; making exaggerated or oscillating claims to disguise bad faith 
conduct;122 and reporting hacks or other interruptions of their business 
activity.123 This conduct, combined with the features of cryptocurrency that 
make it difficult for a court to control and which enable fraud,124 may be 
sufficient to show likely irreparable harm unless a defendant’s conduct is 
enjoined.  
Imminent irreparable harm may also be shown if the defendant signals 
they are likely to ignore litigation altogether. Cryptocurrency is rooted in 
anti-authoritarian ideals; the idea of a currency uncontrollable by any 
government is attractive to those with an anarchistic bent. Some defendants 
manifest this ideology during litigation by failing to meaningfully respond to 
court orders or rules of procedures. Occasionally such a defendant will hire 
an attorney, only for that attorney to withdraw as counsel after a period of 
time, citing difficulties working with the defendant.125 Eventually, the court 
 
117 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1). 
118 See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
119 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 574 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
120 See Deckert v. Indep. Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 290 (1940). 
121 See, e.g., Liu Complaint, supra note 20, at 7–9. 
122 See, e.g., SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-cv-416, 2014 BL 259471, at *3–*6 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 
2014) (finding that the defendant made increasingly incredible claims as to how he was able to pay 
“profits” in what was actually a Ponzi scheme, in order to attract new investors to sustain the scheme). 
123 See, e.g., Liu Complaint, supra note 20, at 7–9. 
124 See supra Section 0 and Part 0; see also Bitconnect Preliminary Injunction, supra note 158, at 
7. See generally Scott Isaacson, The Bamboozling Bite of Bitcoin: Bitcoin Doesn’t Make White Collar 
Crime Possible, but It Does Make It Easier!, UTAH B.J., July-August 2017, at 32–33. 
125 See, e.g., Motion to Withdraw as Attorney for Defendants at 2, Hussein, No. 14-cv-05735 
(N.D. Ill. filed Feb. 2, 2015) (defendants failing to meet obligations to attorneys and systemic failures to 
communicate); Motion to Withdraw as Attorney for Defendants at 3, Lenell v. Advanced Mining Tech., 
Inc., No. 14-cv-01924 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2015) (defendants did not pay attorneys); Unopposed Motion to 
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determines the defendant is ignoring the court and renders a default judgment 
upon the plaintiff’s motion.126 Plaintiffs showing that the defendant is likely 
to ignore court proceedings may be able to persuade the court that 
preliminary injunctive relief is necessary to ensure that a defendant does not 
hide assets in an attempt to judgment-proof themselves. 
Two forms of preliminary injunctive relief warrant discussion in the 
cryptocurrency asset recovery context: (1) asset freeze orders—court orders 
preventing the disposal or shifting of assets—and (2) receiverships—placing 
a business entity or assets under the control of a court-appointed receiver.  
2. Asset Freeze Orders  
Courts may order a party to not sell or transfer assets under the control 
using an asset freeze order, a form of preliminary junctive relief. The party 
requesting the asset freeze must monitor for violations of the order. If a party 
violates the order, they may inform the court, and the court will order the 
enjoined party to show cause why she should not be held in contempt. 
Asset freeze orders may include cryptocurrency assets.127 Defendants 
could only dispose of cryptocurrency assets at the risk of contempt of court. 
However, a plaintiff would need to know the bitcoin addresses of the frozen 
cryptocurrencies to monitor for violations of the freeze order. An advantage 
of the blockchain’s public distributed ledger is that a plaintiff armed with the 
knowledge of the bitcoin addresses can determine the timing, amounts, and 
destination accounts of any cryptocurrency transactions.  
Plaintiffs successfully persuaded a court to issue a preliminary 
injunction in Greene v. MtGox Inc., requiring defendants to freeze assets, 
preserve data, and other ancillary remedies.128 The case arose from plaintiffs 
seeking recovery of their lost funds due to the hacking and subsequent 
collapse of the Mt. Gox cryptocurrency exchange.129 Mt. Gox and the bank it 
 
Withdraw as Counsel for Defendants at 1, Shavers, No. 4:13-cv-416 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2014) 
(defendants dismissing attorney). 
126 Liu Final Default Judgment, supra note 3, at 1 (failing to respond to court); Garza Default 
Judgment, supra note 109, at 1 (failing to respond to court); Motion for Default Entry at 1, Audet v. Garza, 
No. 3:16-cv-00940 (D. Conn. Feb. 23, 2017) (requesting default judgment against some defendants who 
failed to respond to complaint); Order of Default Judgment at 1, Hussein, No. 14-cv-05735 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 
6, 2015), (failing to “appear, plead, or otherwise defend in this action”); Lenell, No. 14-cv-01924 (noting 
in the docket that all documents served on defendants are returned undeliverable). 
127 See, e.g., Order Freezing Assets and Granting Other Ancillary Relief at 3, Shavers, No. 4:13-
cv-416 (E.D. Tex. July 23, 2013) [hereinafter Shavers Freeze Assets Order]. 
128 See Temporary Restraining Order at 4–6, No. 1:14-cv-01437 (N.D. Ill. entered Mar. 11, 2014). 
129 See supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text. 
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used for fiat currency transactions were in Japan.130 Plaintiffs argued that the 
defendants were effectively insolvent and would be unable to satisfy a money 
judgment, and that allowing the defendant to liquidate any other assets—for 
example, transferring assets to the personal ownership of its operators—
would cause irreparable harm.131 Plaintiffs also argued that allowing a foreign 
entity to preferentially dissipate assets at the expense of domestic consumers 
would be to support a policy where foreign companies may feel free “to cheat 
and steal from U.S. consumers with impunity.”132 The court agreed.133 
The fact that defendants are in the process of selling cryptocurrency is 
not sufficient to prove irreparable harm. In MacDonald v. Dynamic Ledger 
Solutions, Inc., the court denied injunctive relief in a case involving 
substantial amounts of cryptocurrency.134 Plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendants were looting a company by liquidating massive amounts of 
cryptocurrency and converting the assets into fiat currency, and that this 
conduct would prevent them from adequate compensation in the event they 
prevailed in their case.135 The court held that simply converting 
cryptocurrency into conventional cash equivalents would not prevent the 
plaintiffs from recovering under a favorable judgment, because there was no 
evidence that the defendants were disposing the proceeds of the 
cryptocurrency sales.136  
Freeze orders may be ineffective applied to defendants undeterred by 
the threat of contempt for violating the order. This is what occurred in 
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Shavers.137 In that case, the court 
ordered Shavers’ assets frozen, and ordered him to turn over all records so 
that the SEC could account for his assets and prevent probable loss.138 
Shavers never turned over the records.139 When the court held a show cause 
hearing why Shavers should not be held in contempt—a year after the freeze 
 
130 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction at 22, Greene, No. 1:14-
cv-01437 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Greene TRO Motion]. 
131 See id. at 19-21; see also Deckert v. Indep. Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 290 (1940) 
(preliminary injunction of money assets proper where defendant “was insolvent and its assets in danger 
of dissipation or depletion”). 
132 Greene TRO Motion, supra note 130, at 22. 
133 See Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 128, at 2. 
134 No. 3:17-cv-07095, 2017 BL 456346, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2017). 
135 Id. at *3. 
136 Id. at *4 (“The conversion of some portion of the volatile cryptocurrency assets into more 
stable currency is unlikely to jeopardize MacDonald’s ability to recover the 18.145 Ethereum he 
contributed (or its equivalent economic value) should he ultimately prevail.”). 
137 No. 4:13-cv-416, 2014 BL 259471, at *14–16 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 18, 2014). 
138 Shavers Freeze Assets Order, supra note 127, at 1. 
139 Order to Show Cause at 1, Shavers, No. 4:13-cv-416 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2014) [hereinafter 
Shavers Show Cause Order]. 
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order had been issued—Shavers claimed to have “loaned” over 200,000 
Bitcoin to an anonymous person.140 He then claimed to have deleted all 
records of the transaction, including the sending Bitcoin addresses under his 
control.141 It only takes a moment to transfer cryptocurrencies. Shavers had a 
year, and thus plenty of opportunity to transfer his cryptocurrency, worth 
approximately $1 billion.142  
3. Receiverships 
Plaintiffs may request appointment of a receiver as a method of 
controlling a defendant’s assets, before or after judgment.143 Receivers are 
court-appointed trustees that, inter alia, manage entities or assets when the 
owners pose the risk of liquidating their assets for their own personal benefit, 
and when the requesting party has a right or interest in the assets.144 
Requesting receivership as a preliminary equitable remedy is subject to the 
same restrictions as other preliminary injunctive relief, including the 
requirement of a showing of irreparable harm.145  
A receiver may oversee cryptocurrency assets like any other asset. This 
requires either control of the private key that accesses the cryptocurrency, or 
the defendant transferring the cryptocurrency to accounts under the receiver’s 
exclusive control pending resolution of the litigation.146  
4. Avoiding Fraudulent Transfers 
Plaintiffs unable to meet the requirements for a preliminary injunction 
may seek avoidance of fraudulent transfers. Fraudulent transfer acts create 
statutory causes of action to remedy the situation where defendants attempt 
to dispose of assets that would otherwise be subject to a possible judgment.147 
 
140 Shavers, 2014 BL 259471, at *11. 
141 Id. 
142 See COINDESK bitcoin Price, supra note 13. 
143 See FED. R. CIV. P. 66. 
144 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 607.1432(1), (3) (2018). 
145 See supra Section 0. 
146 Cryptsy was under control of a court-appointed receiver after Vernon had liquidated some 
portion of the company’s assets and fled the country. But the receiver never had control of the company’s 
bitcoin addresses. Vernon maintained that control and was stealing funds from those addresses even after 
the receiver took control of Cryptsy. Liu Complaint, supra note 20, at 9–10; Mullesch Affidavit, supra 
note 7, at 2–7 (“It appears that Mr. Vernon has transferred, and continues to transfer, a large amount of 
coins traceable back to Cryptsy wallets to new addresses beyond the Receiver’s control after the 
Receiver’s appointment.”). 
147 Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 322 (1999) (“[T]here is 
absolutely nothing new about debtors’ trying to avoid paying their debts, or seeking to favor some 
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Such acts authorize courts to avoid fraudulent transfers, force the return of 
assets, implement a receivership, or allow the use of other remedies as 
appropriate.148  
Forcing the avoidance of a fraudulent cryptocurrency transfer may be 
difficult, even if one can identify the recipients of the transferred bitcoins. 
This is because the transferred funds are under the sole control of whomever 
possesses the private key of the recipient account.149 However, if a defendant 
relies on third parties for parts of her bitcoin transfers—such as 
cryptocurrency exchanges—or can identify the actual recipient, then a 
plaintiff may be able to seek fraudulent transfer remedies against those 
parties, if the party is within the court’s jurisdiction.150  
B. Post-Judgment Enforcement 
Generally, enforcement of civil liabilities begins with the entry of a 
judgment.151 The judgment creditor then requires a court’s writ of execution 
to enforce the judgment.152 That writ of execution empowers local law 
enforcement to levy—seize and sell property—to satisfy the judgment.153 A 
judgment creditor may also pursue writs of garnishment or attachment, 
granting the creditor a right to some or all of the judgment debtor’s wages, 
property, or other debt owing in satisfaction of the judgment debt.154 These 
writs may be served directly on the debtor, or on employers or banks to force 
the payment of judgment debts.155 If the judgment creditor prevailed on a 
replevin claim, then she may use a writ of replevin to have local law 
enforcement seize and return the property at issue to the creditor.156  
Cryptocurrencies are tailor-made to resist control by external 
authorities, and this limits the efficacy of certain judgment enforcement 
 
creditors over others—or even about their seeking to achieve these ends through ‘sophisticated . . . 
strategies.’ The law of fraudulent conveyances and bankruptcy was developed to prevent such conduct 
. . . .” (quoting id. at 338 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting))). 
148 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 726.108 (2018). 
149 See supra Section 0. 
150 See, e.g., Complaint at 7–12, Kasolas v. Lowe, No. 3:15-ap-03011 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. filed Feb 
17, 2015). 
151 LoPucki, supra note 110, at 13. 
152 FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(1). 
153 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 56.21 (2018). 
154 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 77.01 (2018). 
155 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 64(b) (listing available civil remedies for seizing property); 
Carrie A. Tendler, Jef Klazen & Michael A. Sanfilippo, United States, in GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: 
1 ASSET RECOVERY 2018 (2014), Lexis 2018-1 GTDT: Asset Recovery (listing asset recovery options 
available in civil cases). 
156 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 78.01 (2018). 
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mechanisms when the possessor resists surrendering the cryptocurrency.157 
Whereas wages may be garnished by serving a writ of garnishment on an 
employer, or a bank account may be seized by a writ of attachment served on 
a bank, there are no analogous third parties that can grant control over 
cryptocurrency.158  
Several judgment enforcement procedures may be effective to recover 
cryptocurrency from judgment debtors: levy, replevin, judgment liens, and 
receiverships.159 The limited usefulness of contempt against cryptocurrency 
defendants as an ultimate enforcement mechanism is also discussed.  
1. Execution, Levy, and Replevin 
Judgment creditors may seize and sell property to satisfy a judgment, 
pursuant to a writ of execution, by levy.160 A creditor levies property by 
providing local law enforcement the court’s writ of execution and the identity 
and location of property subject to levy.161 The local law enforcement levying 
the property, often the sheriff, will then sell at auction the seized property to 
satisfy the judgment debt.162  
Plaintiffs succeeding on a claim for replevin—a demand for the return 
of wrongfully taken property—may enforce the judgment in a manner similar 
to execution and levy. However, instead of the sheriff selling property to 
satisfy a money judgment, the sheriff returns the replevied property to the 
rightful owner.163  
Cryptocurrency may be seized, pursuant to a levy or writ of replevin,164 
by taking the private key, granting control over the assets. This requires the 
judgment creditor locating the private key, informing the sheriff, and the 
sheriff taking the private key from its possessor. Seizure may be impractical 
if a judgment debtor does not disclose a private key’s location pursuant to 
discovery. Independently locating a private key may be difficult, because a 
 
157 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
158 See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 7, Paige v. 
Bitconnect Int’l PLC, No. 3:18-cv-00058 (W.D. Ky. filed Jan. 29, 2018) (arguing that the jurisdiction’s 
attachment statute would be impractical or impossible to apply against cryptocurrencies), granted (W.D. 
Ky. Feb. 9, 2018) [hereinafter Bitconnect Preliminary Injunction]. 
159 See section 0, supra, for analysis of receiverships applied to cryptocurrency defendants.  
160 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 56.27 (2018). 
161 See, e.g., How to Collect a Judgment in Florida, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://dos.myflorida.com/sunbiz/forms/judgment-lien/collect-judgment/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2016) (“The 
sheriff’s department will not locate the property for you.”).  
162 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 56.27 (2018). 
163 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 78.01 (2018). 
164 See, e.g., Kleiman Complaint, supra note 107, at 34–35 (alleging replevin claim for the return 
of approximately $10 billion in bitcoins). 
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private key may be stored on a device, a piece of paper, memorized, or even 
divided up and placed in multiple locations.165 Even if the private key is 
seized, the sheriff would need to transfer the funds to another bitcoin address 
to prevent theft. Otherwise, a third party with access to a copy of the private 
key could prevent the sale or return of the seized cryptocurrency by shifting 
the funds out of the bitcoin address associated with the seized private key. 
Because cryptocurrency is relatively new, a judgment creditor would need to 
instruct local law enforcement what exactly is being seized and how to 
protect it post-seizure so they may dispose of the property successfully.  
2. Judgment Liens 
Tangible personal property may become subject to a lien upon execution 
of a judgment.166 Jurisdictions vary in how a judgment creditor may enforce 
their rights against a judgment debtor’s assets, but generally the lien is a 
creation of a possessory interest in the liened property.167 Unless a statute 
provides otherwise, judgment liens are not enforced against innocent 
purchasers—those that have no notice of the lien—as a matter of equity.168 
In such a circumstance, a lien creditor would need to avoid the transfer of the 
property under a fraudulent transfer act or similar statute.169  
Cryptocurrencies are subject to judgment liens in jurisdictions that allow 
such liens on personal property. Courts addressing the issue treat bitcoins as 
tangible personal property, controlled by a private key that is capable of 
manifestation.170 Accordingly, judgment liens may allow a judgment creditor 
to recovery cryptocurrency from a judgment debtor, possibly by enforcing a 
lien against third parties to whom the judgment debtor transferred bitcoins. 
The Bitcoin blockchain allows the tracing of bitcoin transactions.171 
Using the public distributed ledger that is the backbone of Bitcoin, one can 
track the transfer of bitcoins from address to address.172 Knowing the owner 
 
165 See supra Section 0 (describing how private keys are stored). 
166 See David Gray Carlson, Critique of Money Judgment Part Three: Restraining Notices, 77 
ALB. L. REV. 1489, 1502 (2014). 
167 See id. at 1502–03. 
168 See D.C. v. Lyon, 161 U.S. 200, 206–07 (1896). 
169 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 726.108 (2018). 
170 See Raskin, supra note 9, at 983. 
171 See MIT TECH. REV., supra note 63, at 3–4 and accompanying text; see also supra text 
accompanying note 64; supra text accompanying note 65; Ludwin, supra note 66, at 3 and accompanying 
text. 
172 See MIT TECH. REV., supra note 63, at 3–4 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying 
note 64. 
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of an address allows tying these transaction records to a person.173 Users of 
the infamous Silk Road discovered that their online transactions were 
traceable, and that there was no way to erase these records embedded in the 
blockchain.174 Silk Road was an online black-market clearinghouse for illicit 
goods that accepted bitcoins as payment for anything from drugs to 
assassinations.175 Determining the bitcoin addresses used by Silk Road 
allowed criminal investigators to trace transactions through the blockchain to 
accounts used by Silk Road customers.176  
A plaintiff can use Bitcoin’s traceability to enforce judgment liens 
against third parties who acquire illicit bitcoins from the judgment debtor,177 
but tracing bitcoin transactions is difficult and requires some forensic 
computing expertise. Tracing transactions from a Bitcoin address to a person 
requires knowing the identity of a Bitcoin address’s owner.178 Bitcoin address 
services that list some identifying information exist, but they rely on third 
parties manually submitting reports of Bitcoin addresses.179 Such haphazard 
databases will be imperfect and incomplete tools for identifying owners.  
Furthermore, Bitcoin users now take measures to obscure their digital 
trail. People learned from Silk Road and developed “best practices” to make 
tracing transactions difficult. One such practice is to create many Bitcoin 
addresses, limiting the use of one Bitcoin address to one incoming 
transaction.180 Users can also “tumble” their outgoing bitcoin transactions, 
combining transactions together using intermediaries to digitally launder 
cryptocurrency.181 Tumbling allows users to place their funds in a combined 
address, managed by a third party. That third party then distributes the funds 
to their final destination for each respective customer. Without the internal 
 
173 See MIT TECH. REV., supra note 63, at 2–4 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying 
note 65. 
174 See Andy Greenberg, Your Sloppy Bitcoin Drug Deals Will Haunt You for Years, WIRED (Jan. 
26, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/bitcoin-drug-deals-silk-road-blockchain. 
175 Andy Greenberg, Silk Road Mastermind Ross Ulbricht Convicted of All 7 Charges, WIRED 
(Feb. 4, 2015, 3:57 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/02/silk-road-ross-ulbricht-verdict/. 
176 Id. 
177 Counsel for the plaintiffs victimized by Vernon’s cryptocurrency theft proposed just such an 
approach: “I believe we are going to keep tracking down the users and trace the bitcoin through the 
blockchain, and when someone tries to move some of it, we will hopefully locate the person.”“ Morris, 
supra note 1. 
178 Greenberg, supra note 174. 
179 See, e.g., BITCOIN WHO’S WHO, http://bitcoinwhoswho.com/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2018). 
180 See Chris Pacia, Innovations that Enhance Bitcoin Anonymity, BITCOIN NOT BOMBS (Feb. 5, 
2014), http://www.bitcoinnotbombs.com/innovations-that-enhance-bitcoin-anonymity/ (suggesting that 
the problems of a publicly viewable transactions can be “largely mitigated by treating all Bitcoin addresses 
as one-time use addresses.”). 
181 See Jeff John Roberts, Inside Uncle Sam’s Secret Bitcoin Hoard, FORTUNE (Feb. 21, 2018), 
http://fortune.com/2018/02/21/government-forfeiture-bitcoin-auction/. 
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records of the third-party tumbler, an outside observer cannot tell whose 
funds are going to which account. This makes it nearly impossible to 
determine where the bitcoin is being spent.182 And some newer 
cryptocurrencies, based on the fundamental bitcoin technology, increase the 
privacy of transactions by making it more difficult to use their blockchains 
to trace transactions.183 The rise of these privacy-focused cryptocurrencies is 
a response to the traceability of the original bitcoin software. 
 Courts are not likely to enforce judgment liens on innocent third parties 
acquiring illicit bitcoin, even if there were reliable methods to trace bitcoin 
transactions to identifiable people, because of the problem of notice in the 
quasi-anonymous digital currency context.184 Enforcing judgment liens 
against third parties generally requires that the third party have notice of the 
lien prior to acquisition of the property in question.185 There is no mechanism 
for putting potential bitcoin transferees on notice that the bitcoin they are 
acquiring may have a clouded digital title. A lien holder would have to 
independently put potential bitcoin transferees on notice based on their 
knowledge of the judgment debtor’s relationships. But, because 
cryptocurrencies freely cross jurisdictions, there is no reason to expect that a 
judgment debtor would limit their transactions to their known contacts.  
Judgment liens could serve to recover stolen cryptocurrency amid 
certain conditions. Plaintiffs must identify likely third-party recipients of the 
judgment debtor’s digital assets, based on information discovered about the 
defendant’s financial dealings. Plaintiffs must serve those third parties notice 
of a judgment lien on the cryptocurrency. The plaintiffs then will have to 
identify transactions between the defendant’s cryptocurrency accounts and 
the noticed third parties. If the plaintiffs identify such transactions, and the 
third parties are in a jurisdiction that will give force to the plaintiffs’ judgment 
lien,186 then the plaintiffs may recover from that third party. 
3. Contempt of Court 
Civil asset recovery procedures are only effective if they are enforceable 
against defendants. Defendants who do not comply with court orders are 
 
182 Id. 
183 Id.; Lucinda Shen, Bitcoins Worth $4.7 Million Seized in Fake ID Case, FORTUNE (Feb. 9, 
2018) (“[C]riminals are gravitating toward other cryptocurrencies such as Litecoin or Monero instead of 
Bitcoin, as investigators grow more savvy with tracking [Bitcoin].”); Greenberg, supra note 174 
(“[N]ewer digital currencies like Monero and Zcash . . . promise far greater privacy by default.”). 
184 See D.C. v. Lyon, 161 U.S. 200, 206–07 (1896). 
185 Id. 
186 Certain foreign jurisdictions do not enforce domestic judgments. LoPucki, supra note 110, at 
32–33. 
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subject to contempt of court. For example, if person refused a subpoena 
ordering that a bitcoin private key be turned over, the court could hold them 
in contempt.187  
Contempt may be civil or criminal, with differing sanctions.188 Civil 
contempt sanctions are designed to compensate the wronged party or coerce 
obedience with the court’s orders.189 Civil sanctions may include monetary 
fines or preventing the offending party from disputing related issues in the 
case.190 Criminal contempt is reserved for punishing willful disobedience of 
the court’s authority or when the underlying conduct is criminal.191 Criminal 
contempt sanctions may include fines and prison.192 Typically, an alleged 
offender has an opportunity to show cause why they should not be found in 
contempt.193 However, imprisonment is not generally used in the United 
States to enforce the repayment of debts, including enforcing court orders 
necessary to collect those debts.194 
Contempt is only effective at coercing compliance with court orders if 
the defendant wishes to avoid potential contempt sanctions. A defendant may 
ignore monetary sanctions if they feel they have more to lose by cooperating 
with court orders than by being held in contempt. 
Some defendants possessing cryptocurrency became suddenly and 
unexpectedly wealthy due to the rapidly increasing value of these assets. 
Defendants with immense digital assets in proportion to conventional assets 
are more likely to risk contempt rather than expose their digital wealth to 
potential seizure.195  
Securities Exchange Commission v. Shavers illustrates how contempt is 
ineffective against defendants with large digital holdings.196 In 2011, 
Trendon Shavers set up a Ponzi scheme disguised as a bank.197 He accepted 
 
187 See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(g) (“The court for the district where compliance is required . . . may 
hold in contempt a person who, having been served, fails without adequate excuse to obey the subpoena 
or an order related to it.”). 
188 Elizabeth G. Patterson, Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support Obligor: The Silent 
Return of Debtor’s Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 102 (2008). 
189 Id. at 102–03. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 103. 
193 Id. 
194 See LoPucki, supra note 110, at 9. 
195 See generally SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-cv-416, 2014 BL 259471 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2014) 
(illustrating one of the only examples of a contempt order issued relating to a cryptocurrency case, where 
the defendant apparently protected approximately 200,000 bitcoins by ignoring court orders to disclose 
his accounts, freeze assets, and repatriate funds). 
196 See generally id. 
197 Id. at *1. 
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bitcoin investments in return for incredible interest rates, as high as 3,641% 
annually.198 At one point during the scheme, Shavers had accumulated “about 
seven percent of all the Bitcoin that was in public circulation at the time.”199 
In 2012, he apparently siphoned off around 200,000 Bitcoin, deleted most 
records of his transactions, and declared the scheme defunct.200 In its civil 
case against Shavers, the SEC requested and received a court order 
instructing Shavers to freeze his assets, to repatriate any assets he had 
transferred away, and to give a full accounting of his assets (digital and 
otherwise) and other discovery to the SEC for its case.201  
Shavers did not comply with the court order.202 Shavers claimed that the 
200,000 stolen Bitcoin were lent to an anonymous person whom he had never 
met and could not identify.203 He stated that he could not provide any other 
information about this fantastic transaction, because he had deleted all related 
records.204  
The court shared the SEC’s incredulity over these allegations and 
ordered Shavers to show cause why he should not be held in contempt.205 In 
the show cause order, the court limited its threatened contempt sanctions to 
preventing Shavers from admitting evidence that would (essentially) allow 
him to win his case.206 This was not sufficient to persuade Shavers to 
cooperate. Eventually, the court ordered summary judgment against Shavers 
because he simply had no credible facts to dispute the SEC’s claims.207 The 
court ordered him to pay over $40 million, mostly in disgorgement to 
compensate his victims.208 Shavers’ 200,000 lost Bitcoin are worth 
approximately two billion dollars.209 That amount of money at stake may 
 
198 U.S. Atty’s Office for S.D.N.Y., Texas Man Sentenced for Operating Bitcoin Ponzi Scheme, 
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/texas-man-sentenced-operating-
bitcoin-ponzi-scheme. The United States convicted Trendon Shavers of the theft of 146,000 Bitcoin and 
sent him to prison in a case parallel to his Securities and Exchange Commission civil case. Id.  
199 Id. 
200 Shavers, 2014 BL 259471, at *7. 
201 Shavers Freeze Assets Order, supra note 127, at 1. 
202 See Shavers Show Cause Order, supra note 139, at 1 (“It appears that Shavers has willfully 
refused to comply with: (a) the Court’s August 5, 2013 Order Freezing Assets and Granting other 
Ancillary Relief; (b) the Court’s August 29, 2013 Order; and (c) his discovery obligations in this 
litigation.”). 
203 Shavers, 2014 BL 259471, at *11. 
204 Id. 
205 See Shavers Show Cause Order, supra note 139, at 1. 
206 Id. at 2. 
207 See Shavers, 2014 BL 259471, at *7 (“Shavers’ claims concerning the lending activity he 
supposedly undertook . . . are not possible based on the record evidence in this action.”). 
208 Id. at *12. 
209 See COINDESK bitcoin Price, supra note 13. 
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explain why contempt may not be effective against a defendant whose wealth 
is largely digital and easy to hide.  
IV. MITIGATING CRYPTOCURRENCY ASSET RECOVERY 
CHALLENGES 
Plaintiffs may improve their chances at recovering cryptocurrency 
assets by incorporating lessons learned from other cases mixed with an 
application of common sense. This includes extensive and stealthy pre-
complaint investigations and partnering with law enforcement or regulatory 
agencies when possible. 
A. Pre-Complaint Investigations 
Attempting to recover cryptocurrency from a defendant may be difficult, 
but sufficient preparation prior to a complaint can improve your chances of 
successful recovery. Because cryptocurrencies can be transferred almost 
instantly, avoiding giving a defendant notice is important.  
A lot of useful information can be gleaned prior to filing a complaint. If 
plaintiffs transferred bitcoins to the defendant, they will have some records 
that show the defendant’s receiving bitcoin addresses. Employing 
appropriate forensic cryptocurrency experts may allow tracing of bitcoin 
transfers from the defendants’ bitcoin addresses, mapping the defendants’ 
usual spending patterns.210 This is helpful to mitigate against a defendant’s 
bad faith destruction of records, transfers of assets, and to establish the 
identity of his normal vendors, if notice to those vendors of a judgment lien 
were ever required.211  
If pre-complaint investigations uncover evidence of crimes or securities 
law violations, then that information may be provided to the appropriate 
agency for action. Involving those agencies increases the chances of 
successful cryptocurrency asset recovery.  
B. Using Law Enforcement and Regulatory Agencies 
If the defendant or her digital assets arise out of criminal conduct, it 
makes sense to cooperate with law enforcement or regulatory agencies at the 
earliest stage possible. This will minimize the opportunity for defendants to 
relocate digital assets or take measures to prevent disclosure of private keys. 
If the defendant’s conduct violates laws enforced by regulatory agencies, 
 
210 See Greenberg, supra note 174, at 2. 
211 See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
13 - BALTHAZOR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/30/19 7:47 PM 
2019] The Challenges of Cryptocurrency Asset Recovery 1233 
then those agencies have statutory tools that make them effective at 
preventing cryptocurrency defendants from moving their wealth using 
preliminary injunctive relief, including receivers supported by forensic 
computing consultants, asset freezes, and expedited discovery procedures. 
Law enforcement agencies have investigative methods and are able to 
exercise a degree of control over a defendant’s person and their property that 
are unavailable to civil plaintiffs and increases their efficacy in recovering 
stolen cryptocurrency.212 
Additionally, national law enforcement agencies have a better 
opportunity to attain discovery of foreign defendants’ assets, if the defendant 
stores private keys or other assets abroad: 
The United States has more than 70 mutual legal assistance 
treaties (MLATs) with foreign nations that concern the 
sharing of evidence. MLATs are typically employed by the 
US to pursue its own law enforcement interests and are not 
directly available to private litigants. Nevertheless, 
coordination with US authorities can be used in pursuit of 
information. If the government does make such a request, 
then private litigants can utilise US discovery mechanisms 
to attempt to obtain information after information is 
produced in response to the MLAT request.213 
Cooperating with law enforcement thus has benefits to civil plaintiffs in cases 
involving domestic or foreign defendants, where those defendants are also 
suspects in crimes.  
Law enforcement agencies such as the FBI and DEA are much more 
effective at recovering illicitly procured digital assets than plaintiffs relying 
on civil actions alone. Law enforcement agencies do not need to wait on court 
ordered contempt proceedings to force a suspect to disclose their assets or 
provide access to their cryptocurrency.214 These agencies are becoming more 
familiar with where to locate private keys, or how to convince a suspect to 
surrender their private keys; law enforcement can threaten liberty in a way 
civil plaintiffs cannot.215 The agencies transfer assets to law enforcement 
 
212 See, e.g., Criminal Complaint at 1–14, U.S. v. Kim, No. 1:18-cr-00107 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2018) 
(illustrating the ability of law enforcement to covertly collect information about a suspect’s activities, 
including copies of text messages, that are not readily available to civil plaintiffs).  
213 Tendler, Klazen & Sanfilippo, supra note 155, at 5. 
214 E.g., United States v. 50.44 Bitcoins, No. ELH-15-3692, 2016 BL 171855, at *1–*3 
(recommending that the Bitcoins be forfeited to the United States). See generally Raskin, supra note 9, at 
980–83 (describing two criminal cases where the court ordered seizure of cryptocurrency assets). 
215 Shen, supra note 183 (reporting that law enforcement is growing increasingly adept at tracking 
Bitcoin transactions); Roberts, supra note 181, at 3 (“In private-key cases, the only way law enforcement 
can quickly obtain the Bitcoin is if the suspect reveals the key.”). 
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controlled bitcoin addresses, divesting access from the former possessor.216 
After the coin is seized, victims may apply to the Department of Justice for 
restitution.217 
In 2013, federal law enforcement agents suspected Ross Ulbricht of 
operating Silk Road.218 Silk Road was a multi-million-dollar digital 
clearinghouse for drugs and other illegal goods and services.219 When they 
arrested Ulbricht in a San Francisco library, they seized his laptop before he 
had an opportunity to lock it and consequently recovered his bitcoin private 
keys, giving the agents access to about 175,000 Bitcoins.220 Such a dramatic 
seizure simply has no analog in the civil asset recovery toolbox. 
Certain regulatory agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Federal Trade Commission, or the Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission possess special tools to recover cryptocurrency assets 
from defendants who violate laws under their purview. These agencies can 
secure preliminary relief in situations where that relief may be unavailable to 
private litigants. For example, the SEC, as a “statutory guardian charged with 
safeguarding the public interest in enforcing the securities laws,” has a lower 
burden to meet to secure preliminary relief in cases involving securities law 
violations.221 The SEC does not need to show that irreparable harm would 
result in the absence of the requested preliminary relief.222 Instead, the SEC 
need only “make a prima facie showing that a defendant has violated the 
federal securities laws.”223 Additionally, this different preliminary injunctive 
burden for regulatory agencies allows them to secure ex parte preliminary 
relief in contexts where a court would deny that relief to standard civil 
 
216 See Raskin, supra note 9, at 982–83. 
217 See Roberts, supra note 181, at 9. 
218 Id. at 2–3. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
221 Emergency Motion for Order to Show Cause, Asset Freeze, & Other Ancillary Relief at 9, SEC 
v. Shavers, No. 4:13-cv-00416 (E.D. Tex. July 23, 2013) (citing SEC v. Mgmt. Dynamics, Inc., 
515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975)); see also SEC v. Plexcorps, No. 17-cv-07007, 2017 BL 448742, at *2 
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2017). 
222 Mgmt. Dynamics, 515 F.2d at 808–09 (“[T]he standards of the public interest not the 
requirements of private litigation measure the propriety and need for injunctive relief.” (quoting Hecht 
Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944)). 
223 Emergency Motion for Order to Show Cause, Asset Freeze, & Other Ancillary Relief, supra 
note 221, at 10 (citing CFTC v. Muller, 570 F.2d 1296, 1300 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Aaron v. SEC, 
446 U.S. 680, 700–01 (1980) (interpreting the statutory basis for the SEC’s showing required to establish 
preliminary injunctive relief); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t, 78u (2012). 
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plaintiffs. Similar standards apply to the injunctions sought by the Federal 
Trade Commission224 or the Commodities Futures Trading Commission.225  
Regulatory agencies, taking advantage of their lower burden to secure 
preliminary injunctive relief, are employing a multi-part strategy to prevent 
defendants from hiding cryptocurrency. In SEC v. Arise Bank, the 
Commission filed a motion to appoint a receiver for Arise Bank on the same 
day as they filed their complaint, alleging securities fraud involving 
cryptocurrencies.226 The court granted the order ex parte, limiting the risk 
that Arise Bank would transfer cryptocurrencies to potentially unreachable 
accounts.227 The next day the SEC filed a sealed motion requesting 
appointment of cybersecurity and forensic experts in support of the 
receiver;228 this motion was granted the same day, also under seal.229 This 
strategy appeared to be successful, because after several days the SEC stated 
that the case may proceed unsealed and then filed an amended complaint with 
numerous documents supporting their allegations.230 Civil plaintiffs, required 
to prove irreparable harm, may not be able to make the requisite showing to 
achieve these same results under similar facts.231  
V. CONCLUSION 
Cryptocurrency asset recovery poses challenges surmountable under the 
right conditions. Covert pre-complaint investigation may produce the facts 
necessary to present plaintiffs’ claims to law enforcement or regulatory 
agencies, entities which have more tools to prevent possible judgment 
proofing strategies. Educating the court about the qualities of cryptocurrency 
 
224 See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2012); see also, e.g., Stipulated Interim Order at 1, FTC v. BF Labs, 
Inc., No. 4:14-cv-00815-BCW (W.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2014). 
225 See 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(a) (2012); see also, e.g., CFTC v. McDonnell, No. 18-cv-00361, 2018 
BL 76558, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2018). 
226 Complaint, SEC v. Arise Bank, No. 3:18-cv-00186-M (N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2018); Emergency 
Ex Parte Motion to Temporarily Seal Docket & Proceedings, Arise Bank, No. 3:18-cv-00186-M; 
Emergency Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, Asset Freeze, 
Appointment of Receiver, Document Preservation Order, Order to Make Accounting & Other Emergency 
& Ancillary Relief, Arise Bank, No. 3:18-cv-00186-M.  
227 Ex Parte Orders Granting Emergency Ex Parte Motions, Arise Bank, No. 3:18-cv-00186-M. 
228 Sealed Motion to Employ Kroll Cyber Security as Forensic Expert & Investigative Consultant, 
Arise Bank, No. 3:18-cv-00186-M. 
229 Sealed Order Granting Sealed Motion to Employ Kroll Cyber Security as Forensic Expert & 
Investigative Consultant, Arise Bank, No. 3:18-cv-00186-M. 
230 See Order to Unseal Case, Amended Complaint & Amended Documents, Arise Bank, 
No. 3:18-cv-00186-M. 
231 See MacDonald v. Dynamic Ledger Solutions, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-07095, 2017 BL 456346, at 
*1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2017) (denying a temporary restraining order because plaintiffs failed to show 
irreparable harm). 
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that make it difficult to recover if a defendant moves assets or hides the 
location of private keys may justify preliminary injunctive relief to prevent 
irreparable harm. Courts should consider that cryptocurrencies are uniquely 
suited to evade control by design when balancing the equities and likelihood 
of injury. Finally, extensive factual investigation of a defendant’s 
cryptocurrency network and business contacts will afford plaintiffs the best 
chance to recover under fraudulent transfer statutes or using judgment liens. 
